adequate—solution to the conflicts generated by the two spheres' competing claims on our loyalties.

7. Harry Cleaver offers a similar argument against the labor-work distinction (2002).
8. The notion of "relations of rule" is adapted from Dorothy Smith's (far richer) category of "relations of ruling" (1987, 3).
9. Here, it should be noted, the concepts of living labor and work are rendered more compatible if living labor is conceived not as an interior essence or normative standard, but as a potential for specifically political agency. In this way, the concept serves not as a critical lens so much as "a source of the auto-valorization of subjects and groups, as the creation of social cooperation," as the potential to construct alternatives (Negri 1996, 171). See also Jason Read's similar approach to the category (2003, 90–91).
10. Different but compatible approaches to class as process include Joan Acker's revisiting of class from a feminist perspective (2000), Stanley Aronowitz's insistence on a class theory that places the emphasis on social time over social space (2003), and William Corlett's model of "class action" as a process of labor's self-determination (1998).
11. A relationship that might have been captured by a quantitative logic, measured by the distance between the one in front and the one behind, is revealed as something that must be grasped also in qualitative terms, as attitude, affect, feeling, and symbolic exchange.
12. Indeed, as one radical feminist famously declared, with a combination of daring and grandiosity not uncommon to 1970s feminism, "if there were another word more all-embracing than *revolution* we would use it" (Firestone 1970, 3).
13. Here I obviously part company with more orthodox Arendtian—let alone Nietzschean—analyses that would exclude work from the proper business of the political.
14. To be sure, to affirm the value of this latter agenda focused on freedom is not to discount the ongoing importance of the former committed to equality.
15. I will generally use the label "Marxist feminism" to describe a wide variety of feminisms, including my own, despite the fact that I sometimes draw on sources more typically identified (and often even self-identified) as socialist feminist. The distinction between Marxist feminism and socialist feminism is not always clear. Often they are distinguished by period, with Marxist feminism preceding the development of socialist feminism, and the latter described as a synthesis of Marxism and radical feminism developed in the 1970s. The term "socialist" is also sometimes used as a way to designate a more expansive and inclusive project, one committed to political-economic analysis, but not necessarily to Marxism per se. I prefer the term "Marxist feminism" for two reasons: first, because my own work and many of its points of reference, including the domestic-labor and wages for housework literatures, are indebted to Marxist theoretical traditions; and second, because I am skeptical about the contemporary relevance of the term "socialist," a point I will expand upon below.

16. The late 1960s to the early 1980s marks the period of Marxist feminism's maximum influence within US feminist theory. Today the project lives on, often under other labels, and explores, among other things, how the present organization of both waged and unwaged work—including current instances of the class, gender, race, and transnational divisions of labor—are implicated in the construction and maintenance of class, gender, racial, and national differences and hierarchies.
17. Both Marxists and feminists, as Barbara Ehrenreich explained her understanding of the socialist feminist project in 1976, "seek to understand the world—not in terms of static balances, symmetries, etc. (as in conventional social science)—but in terms of antagonisms" (1997, 66).
18. Perhaps the contemporary literature that most directly addresses social reproduction as a feminist analytic, in this case on the terrain of political economy, comes out of Canada. For some good examples, see Bakker and Gill (2003), Bezanson and Luxton (2006), and Luxton and Corman (2001).
19. "Social reproduction can thus be seen to include various kinds of work—mental, manual, and emotional—aimed at providing the historically and socially, as well as biologically, defined care necessary to maintain existing life and to reproduce the next generation" (Laslett and Brenner 1989, 383).
20. That is, in terms of "the new forms of organization and relations between people which we define as socialism" (Berkeley-Oakland Women's Union 1979, 356), but also sometimes in the more expansive terms of what another group identified as socialist, feminist, and antiracist revolution (Combahee River Collective 1979, 366).
21. Although since it is less a demand for change than a demand for the enforcement of existing policies, it is important to note that even demanding the enforcement of the wage and hours laws already on the books would make an enormous difference, especially to the lives of low-wage workers. See Annette Bernhardt et al. (2009).
22. Another example is the demand for universal healthcare without any ties to employment, although that demand's critique of work per se might be less direct than the critiques posed by the demands for basic income and shorter hours.
23. The demand for less work, as Jonathan Cutler and Stanley Aronowitz explain it, is unusual in its capacity to position workers to make further demands: "No other bargaining demand simultaneously enhances bargaining position" (1998, 20).

1. Mapping the Work Ethic

1. It is worth emphasizing that Weber confines his analysis to Western European and US capitalist social formations (1958, 52).
2. For an elaboration of this argument about the relation between production and subjectivity in Marxism, see Jason Read (2003).
3. For a development of this distinction, see Fredric Jameson's discussion of the difference between an antinomy and a contradiction (1994, 1–7).

4. According to Weber's account of Luther's conception of the calling, "the fulfillment of worldly duties is under all circumstances the only way to live acceptably to God"; thus, "every legitimate calling has exactly the same worth in the sight of God" (1958, 81).
5. This abstraction from the concrete qualities of work is accompanied within ascetic Puritanism by an abstraction of the notion of brotherly love: Christians can obey the commandment not just through the concrete care of specific individuals, but indirectly, through waged work—that is, through "labor in the service of impersonal social usefulness" (Weber 1958, 109).
6. Weber's argument is organized in classic social-scientific format: successive chapters lay out the problem and the hypothesis, followed by discussions of the dependent and independent variables, and then the findings and conclusion.
7. None of the goals—the certainty of an afterlife, social mobility, or self-fulfillment—are new; they coexist in various forms with varying degrees of emphasis in each of the three periods I want to isolate. All three versions—the Protestant, industrial, and postindustrial work ethics—are hybrids, rendered here as ideal types defined by the goal that tends to dominate the discourse of the work ethic in any one period.
8. The postindustrial work ethic returns in this way to the Protestant ethic's notion of work as a calling, thereby partially relieving it once again of a degree of the tangible instrumentality it had acquired in the industrial period, when it was coded as a means to economic mobility.
9. This general confounding of means and ends continues to haunt present understandings of work. Is it an end in itself, or a means to other ends? Does one work, for example, to support a family or support a family in order to make meaningful one's investments in work? That is, do people work because they have families, or do they organize their lives around the familial model of sociality because they work? Is work a means to self-expression and self-development, or are these instead means by which one can make sense of and justify the time and energy one puts into work?
10. Seymour Martin Lipset observes that there is a long-standing tendency for an older generation to believe that the work ethic is not as strong in the younger generation (1992, 45).
11. Part of the story of the changing status of waged work that Fraser and Gordon recount centers on its increasing association with masculinity and whiteness, points that I will take up later in this chapter.
12. What was perhaps more difficult to maintain under the conditions of industrial production and Fordist regularization is perhaps easier to imagine under the conditions of postindustrial production and post-Fordist "flexploitation" (Gray 2004). With the increasing individualization of work (Castells 2000, 282)—in terms, for example, of a varied menu of schedules and contracts (Beck 2000, 54, 55)—work is even more likely to be conceived as a field of individual experience and responsibility.

13. It bears emphasizing here that the work ethic is not merely an ideology in the classic sense of a set of ideas about the value of work that are explicitly pronounced and intentionally propagated. The work ethic is also, as in Louis Althusser's notion of ideology, a set of ideas that inhere in apparatuses and are inscribed in ritualized practices (1971, 166). Althusser notes that in the industrial period of "mature capitalism," the church lost its position as the dominant ideological state apparatus and was replaced by the school (152). Although the school maintains its importance in reproducing the submission of the worker today the work ethic is dependent on neither the church nor the school for its reproduction. Rather, as Michael Burawoy suggests, we need to attend to the ways that consent to its demands is generated at the point of production (1979), via modes of subjectification generated through what Catherine Casey calls the "hidden curriculum" of work (1995, 74)—not just from the ideas that managers ask workers to recite and affirm, but from the practices and relationships, rewards and penalties, that work and workplaces structure.
14. Weber underscores the role that the work ethic plays in enabling exploitation. Rather than just rationalizing the exploitation of preconstituted subjects, it helps to fashion exploitable subjects. But the rewards of the disciplinary subjectivity constituted by the discourse of the work ethic, it should be emphasized, are not just economic; they are also, and more properly, social and political. The possible decline of the work ethic, the fearful consequences of which are periodically debated in the popular press, would lead, according to such accounts, not only to the economic but to the moral decline of the nation. Thus in one such text from the 1980s, the fear that US workers, increasingly given over to laziness and pleasure seeking, would not be able to compete with the industrious Japanese prompted the author to recommend a variety of measures to shore up the work ethic, including teaching it as propaganda in schools and investing in various make-work programs designed to strengthen the ethic (Eisenberger 1989, 224–25, 248). Proposals for disciplinary make-work—to be imposed on welfare recipients, prisoners, and juvenile offenders, to name a few groups—bring us back to that strange confounding of means and ends: rather than promoting the work ethic to make sure that we do the work that needs doing, work is created as a way to instill a work ethic (see also Beder 2000, 139–41). Here we can see more clearly that economic utility is not always what is at stake: work is associated with a host of socially and politically functional behaviors. Thus it is not only employers who have a stake in the work ethic; it is understood to be functional for a variety of regimes of social order and cooperation.
15. Weber did acknowledge the coexistence of competing ethics of work—not only traditionalism, but also, in a passing reference, "the class morality of the proletariat and the anti-authoritarian trade union," against which the dominant ethic protects those willing to work (1958, 167).
16. Today one can hear the echoes of this moral panic over the work ethic in some of the discourses about gay and lesbian marriage, particularly from those who

denigrate certain queer cultures by linking different patterns of supposedly promiscuous intimacies with so-called hedonistic consumer lifestyles and worry that those not ensconced in legible families have, to draw on Lee Edelman's (2004) critical account of such logics, no future for which to sacrifice in the present and, to borrow a concept from Judith Halberstam's critique of such narratives, no reproductive time (2005) around which to regulate their lives productively. Here I would just note a point that I will develop as an argument in another context below: the work ethic also seems to inform the responses of others who contest such assertions, but do so by mirroring their logic—in this case, by insisting that the benefits of marriage and family should be extended by means of a more inclusive family ethic to those now excluded from its supposed beneficial effects as a mode of social discipline.

17. Indeed, multiple versions of the work ethic are generated at the intersections of class, race, ethnicity, and gender, as these hierarchies are constructed, defended, and also contested; dissemination is thus also a process of further differentiation and hybridization.
18. As the quote suggests, Gilman's contribution to the domestic-science movement is interesting for the way that, as Ehrenreich and English observe, she took the argument about the importance of rationalizing domestic production much further, arguing that the private home should no longer serve as its locus (Ehrenreich and English 1975, 25–26). This willingness to extend an insight to its logical conclusion, running roughshod over custom and habit in the process, is reminiscent of the kind of relentless logic that radical feminists from the 1970s periodically used to such usefully disquieting effect.
19. For a classic example of the literature on the ethic of care, see Noddings (1984). For an important revision of this project that confronts the problem of gender essentialism head on and presents an alternative approach to both the ethics and the politics of care, see Tronto (1993). For a contribution to this literature that seeks to conceive care as a social phenomenon rather than an individual attribute, and to imagine the logic of care as an immanent ethical practice as opposed to a moral imperative, see Precarias a la Deriva (2006).
20. Madeline Bunting makes a similar point (2004, 169–70).
21. As Colin Cremin observes, flexible workers are not only expected to achieve employment, but to sustain their fitness for work, their "employability" (2010, 133).
22. Thus, for example, in a book based on interviews with executives at a number of companies that emphasize customer service, the interviewees claim repeatedly that hiring good employees is not about finding people with the right skills, it is about hiring people with the right attitudes (Wiersema 1998).
23. Studies report that across the employment spectrum, attitudes are often more important to managers than aptitude. See, for example, Barnes and Powers (2006, 4–5); Beder (2000, 196); Callaghan and Thompson (2002).
24. Talwar reports that the same equation of appearance with professionalism appears in the codes of fast-food management (2002, 100).

2. Marxism and the Refusal of Work

1. For a few examples, see some of the actions in relation to the figure of San Precario in Italy (Tari and Vanni 2005; De Sario 2007), the Spanish groups Precarias a la Deriva (2006) and Dinero Gratis (http://www.sindominio.net/eldinerogratis/index.html), the Euromarches (Mathers 1999; Gray 2004), and mobilizations around EuroMayDay (http://www.euromayday.org/).
2. See also Maria Milagros López's rich and interesting discussion of emerging postwork subjectivities in postindustrial Puerto Rico, decried by some as a kind of "entitlement attitude" on the part of recipients of state support, but which López examines as "forms of life and work that presume the saliency of the present and which claim rights, needs, entitlements, enjoyment, dignity, and self-valorization outside the structure of wages" (1994, 113).
3. These utopian visions, as I will explain further in chapter 5, are not blueprints for a perfect future, but rather—in keeping with more modest and serviceable conceptions of utopian thinking—attempts to imagine different possibilities and to anticipate alternative modes of life. As inspiring visions, they are designed both to advance the critique of daily life under capital and to stimulate desire for, imagination of, and hope in the possibility of a different future.
4. Ivan Illich offers another example of this kind of critique with his defense of a subsistence economy guided by an ethic of "convivial austerity." We cannot, Illich claims, live autonomously or act creatively "where a professionally engineered commodity has succeeded in replacing a culturally shaped use-value" (1978, 9).
5. On the relation between abstract and concrete labor see also Postone (1996, 353) and Vincent (1991, 97–98).
6. In a rereading of this famous section of *The German Ideology*, Terrell Carver claims that the original draft of the coauthored text indicates that Engels wrote the section, to which Marx made some small additions—including an earlier reference to "a critical critic," the very figure that *The German Ideology* is directed against, and the addition of "after dinner," which serves to belittle the practice of criticizing—that had the effect of making it into an ironic take on the kind of pastoral, pre-industrial utopias to which Marx objected (Carver 1998, 106).
7. Originally associated with the Operaismo, post-Operaismo and Autonomia movements in Italy, autonomist Marxism also developed within several other groups and movements, including the Midnight Notes Collective, Zerowork, the feminist group Lotta Feminista, and the movement for wages for housework. The authors I draw on most frequently in this account include some associated with both autonomist Marxism's early articulation and its later developments including Antonio Negri (also in his later collaboration with Michael Hardt), Paolo Virno, and, in the next chapter, Mariarosa Dalla Costa; some who have been inspired by and have built on elements of the tradition, including Harry Cleaver, Nick Dyer-Witheford, and Jason Read; and, finally, authors of specific